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Lithuania’s responses to the crisis
The mass demonstrations came as a surprise, and 
in response the Lithuanian government has adopt-
ed the tactic of reacting swiftly in support of the 
protesting Belarusians. Vilnius has given shelter 
to dozens of people persecuted by the Lukashen-
ka regime, including Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, 
Lukashenka’s main rival in the elections. Tsikha-
nouskaya was described by the president and 
parliament of Lithuania (in a resolution of 10 Sep-
tember) as the leader chosen by the Belarusian 
people. Lithuanian politicians have legitimised her 
right to represent that part of Belarusian society 
that is demanding new elections and holding 
spontaneous industrial action.
Another form of support which Lithuania is offer-
ing involves making it easier for asylum seekers 
and those who fear for their own or their fam-
ilies’ lives to enter the country. These persons 
will have the right, for humanitarian reasons, to 
cross the border on the basis of permits from 
the Ministry of the Interior, and will be exempt 
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from the obligation to comply with the general 
rules for preventing the spread of the coronavirus. 
Lithuania has also simplified the procedure for 
professionals (mainly expected to be Belarusian 
IT specialists) who want to move their business-
es. It has also announced a doubling of financial 
support for Belarusian students studying at the 
European Humanities University (EHU) in Vilnius, 
which was transferred there from Minsk in 2005. 
Lithuania has also proposed that the European 
Commission should set up an EU support fund 
for the Belarusian opposition.
Lithuania has applied individual restrictions tar-
geted directly at the interests of persons associ-
ated with the Lukashenka regime. The list pub-
lished on 31 August included 32 names, including 
Lukashenka himself, his son Viktar, and members 
of the dictator’s administration and ministries 
of force; these people will not be allowed to en-
ter Lithuania for a period of five years. President 
Gitanas Nausėda announced that the decision 
had been consulted with the Latvian and Estonian 
governments, who had included the same names 
on their own national sanctions lists. Vilnius has 
announced that the list will be expanded (the 
Lithuanian foreign ministry is seeking to include 
118 people on it), but its overarching goal in the 
implementation of sanctions is to obtain the broad-
est possible international support for this form of 
pressure on the Lukashenka regime.
Another key element of Lithuania’s actions involves 
raising the Belarusian issue at the international 
level. President Nausėda and Linas Linkevičius 
(who has been foreign minister since 2012, and 
previously served as his country’s ambassador to 
Belarus) have been most active in this field and in 
the Western media. Lithuania’s activities abroad 
have been strengthened by its cooperation with 
the other countries of the region, which are also 
seeking to maintain international pressure on 
Minsk to stop the persecution of demonstrators 
and hold new elections. On 11 August the foreign 
ministers of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine called 
on the Belarusian government to stop the use 
of force, as part of the Lublin Triangle initiative. 
President Nausėda presented a three-point plan 
to resolve the crisis (a halt to violence, the release 
of detainees, and the resumption of dialogue with 
civil society) after consultation with and support 
from the presidents of Poland, Latvia and Estonia. 
On 19 August an extraordinary meeting of the 
European Council concerning Belarus took place, 
at Lithuania’s initiative, during which the issue of 
EU sanctions was discussed.
Lithuania’s increasingly hostile eastern 
neighbourhood
In recent years, Lithuanian-Belarusian relations 
have been severely burdened by the issue of the 
Astravyets nuclear power plant near the border 
with Lithuania (the Lithuanian side considers it to 
be potentially dangerous). Now there is a second 
issue of principled importance for Vilnius – dem-
ocratic elections in Belarus. Minsk rejected Presi-
dent Nausėda’s offer of mediation, and deployed 
additional military units at the border in response. 
Bilateral Lithuanian-Belarusian relations were al-
ready cool (diplomatic relations have been frozen, 
but economic cooperation has been maintained), 
but they have now moved into a state of deep 
crisis, with no prospect of a breakthrough as long 
as Lukashenka remains in power.
However, economic cooperation can still contin-
ue as long as Belarus remains a separate politi-
cal entity, even if Lukashenka remains in power. 
Lithuania has never been in favour of economic 
sanctions against Belarus. Despite the two states’ 
disputes over the Astravyets nuclear power plant, 
in recent years economic cooperation between 
them has developed: in 2018 trade rose by 11%, 
and in 2019 Belarusian imports to Lithuania rose 
by about 2.4%, and Lithuanian exports to Belarus 
by about 6.4%.
Although Lukashenka has threatened to redi-
rect Belarusian transit in response to Lithuania’s 
The Lithuanian government’s Bela-
rusian partner is now the opposi-
tion, whose interests Vilnius is now 
working to defend, including on the 
international stage.
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restrictions, Vilnius still expects the dictator’s 
future decisions to be pragmatic. One third of 
the cargo in the port of Klaipėda is made up of 
Belarusian goods, mainly fertilisers for export. 
Klaipėda also mediates the import and export of 
crude oil and oil products between Belarus and 
its Western partners. Redirecting transit would 
mean significantly higher costs for Belarus and 
reduce the competitiveness of its products. Lithu-
ania therefore has reason to expect that, despite 
the hostility in political relations and the clear 
signal of the suspension of diplomatic relations 
with the Lukashenka regime, the two countries’ 
economic relations, and thus their business ties, 
will not come to a halt.
Relations between the two societies are close, 
despite the continuing disputes over the com-
mon history and heritage of the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania. Belarusians often chose to migrate 
to Lithuania during the Soviet period, and they 
now make up the third largest minority (1.2%) in 
Lithuania (after Poles, who according to the Lith-
uanian Department of National Minorities make 
up 6.6% of the population, and Russians [5.8%]). 
Belarusians are also the second most common 
migrant nationality to Lithuania after Ukrainians: 
in 2018 Ukrainians accounted for 46.5% of immi-
grants, and Belarusians 26.4%. Social contacts are 
facilitated by the fact that the two nations are 
more familiar with post-Soviet reality, and can 
communicate in the Russian language. The EHU 
has hosted more than 2500 students during its 
15 years of existence, 95% of whom have been 
Belarusian citizens. Lithuania has also supported 
the Belarusian opposition for years.
Vilnius’s involvement in the crisis in Belarus will 
re-inflame relations with Russia, which Lithuania 
sees as a hostile state working to undermine its 
interests and security. It also accuses Moscow of 
making the Belarusian economy dependent on 
Russia’s, of providing support to Lukashenka’s re-
gime against the will of the public, and of seeking 
to annex the country. This assessment was reflect-
ed in the resolution adopted on 10 September by 
the Lithuanian Parliament “on the illegal Russian 
union imposed on Belarus”. The deputies called 
on the Russian government not to interfere in 
Belarus’s domestic and foreign policy. They also 
asked the international community to recognise 
any possible agreement on the deeper integra-
tion of the two countries as a crime against the 
Belarusian people and an annexation of Belarus.
Russia sees Lithuania’s involvement on the side 
of the protesters as meddling in Belarus’ internal 
affairs. The Lithuanian government has played 
down Lukashenka’s statements about the military 
threat from NATO countries, and sent a message 
to Russia that the political consequences of its 
possible military support for Belarus would be 
detrimental to Moscow.
Domestic divisions in Lithuania 
on the situation in Belarus
Despite Lithuania’s consistent position on the 
crisis in Belarus, there are domestic political dif-
ferences on how it should approach cooperation 
with its neighbour. Parliamentary elections will 
be held in Lithuania on 11 October; the campaign 
has mainly focused on domestic issues, but the 
political community’s reaction to the events in 
Belarus has also become part of the discussion.
In view of the upcoming elections, the Lithuanian 
parliament has been particularly active in the face 
of the Belarusian crisis. On 2 September, deputies 
from various groups created a delegation for 
Belarusian affairs (led by the Social Democratic 
deputy Gediminas Kirkilas), which is ready to travel 
to Belarus as soon as possible, that is after dem-
ocratic transformations take place in the country. 
In recent weeks, the Lithuanian parliament has 
adopted two resolutions in support of the op-
position and its leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. 
Their unambiguous nature has clearly determined 
that a return to cooperation with Lukashenka will 
Vilnius has placed particular empha-
sis on maintaining ties with Belaru-
sian society, in the expectation that 
despite the hostility in their political 
relations, business links between the 
countries will not come to a halt.
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not be possible. These were initiated by a group 
of conservatives in cooperation with the Social 
Democratic foreign minister Linas Linkevičius. The 
right-wing conservative opposition (which is lead-
ing in pre-election polls, but whose advantage 
over the ruling Union of Peasants and Greens 
[LVŽS] is not large) has criticised the government, 
with the exception of the foreign minister, for 
being too limited in its action against Belarus and 
issuing too short a list of sanctioned persons. This 
is also an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
work of the interior minister Rita Tamašunienė, 
who represents the Electoral Action of Poles in 
Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance (EAPL–CFA 
/ AWPL–ZCHR (pl.), LLRA–KŠS (lit.)) in the govern-
ment (the Polish minority party is still in conflict 
with the conservatives). Her ministry limited the 
list to 32 names, although the possibility of ex-
panding it has been left open, especially (as the 
government most strongly anticipates) in cooper-
ation with the other countries in the region and 
the Western allies.
The conservatives – together with the liberals, 
including the newly formed Freedom Party – have 
adopted the most principled position: while refus-
ing any possibility of maintaining cooperation with 
the Belarusian authorities, they are nevertheless 
demanding – despite the risks this would pose 
to economic relations – that the regime closes 
the power plant in Astravyets, releases politi-
cal prisoners and conducts democratic elections. 
A similar position has been taken by the LVŽS as 
it competes with the conservatives; it has also de-
clared – probably out of fear of possible criticism 
from the right-wing opposition – that it does not 
intend to cooperate with Minsk until the inter-
national community recognises the outcome of 
democratic elections in Belarus. The party believes 
that Lithuania’s capacity to act against Belarus is 
limited, and has mainly called for support to be 
offered to the repressed.
The most critical position on the attitude of the 
Lithuanian right has been adopted by the Electoral 
Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families 
Alliance. The Polish group did not support the par-
liament’s resolution of 10 September, considering 
it to be part of the right’s election campaign, and 
not an initiative which would genuinely contribute 
to change in the situation in Belarus. According 
to its leader Valdemar Tomaševski (Waldemar 
Tomaszewski), Lithuanian politicians are ignor-
ing Lukashenka’s continued popularity in the 
provinces. The Polish party has advocated social 
dialogue instead of the public resolutions issued 
by the parliament. Most other groups are calling 
for continued cooperation with Belarus within 
the framework of neighbourly relations; however, 
they emphasise that this cannot happen at the 
cost of violations of human rights and democratic 
principles.
Lithuania’s cooperation with the dicta-
tor: more negatives than positives
In the past, Lukashenka has repeatedly called 
upon political and economic support from Vilni-
us when his country’s disputes with Russia have 
become more serious. Lithuania has seen his sig-
nals of openness to contacts and cooperation 
as a desire to pursue a policy that was slightly 
more independent of Moscow – something which 
Lithuania wanted to support, especially in the 
areas of economic and energy cooperation. The 
construction of the power plant in Astravyets, 
which will keep Belarus’s economy’s dependent 
on Russia, has become a symbol of the failure 
of Lithuania’s expectations towards Lukashenka. 
His search for support in Moscow to maintain 
his hold on power, despite the mass social pro-
tests, will inevitably bring about the Lithuanian 
government’s final withdrawal from the policy 
of maintaining contacts and cooperation with 
the dictator. Vilnius’s breaking off relations with 
Lukashenka is mainly determined by the need to 
oppose human rights violations. If it did not insist 
on their observance, Lithuania would become less 
credible as an intermediary in the EU’s relations 
with Belarus, and as a country supporting the 
latter’s process of democratisation.
Lithuania is trying to compensate 
for its failures in its relations with 
Lukashenko thus far by the activity 
and assistance it is offering to the 
Belarusian opposition.
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Lithuania is currently seeking to compensate for 
its failure in its relations with Lukashenka by pro-
viding activity and assistance to the Belarusian 
opposition, which is becoming its new partner in 
bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Vilnius is becoming 
its main international spokesman (next to Poland). 
An additional political advantage for Lithuania in 
representing the interests of the protesting Bela-
rusians lies in the consolidation of other countries 
in the region around this issue – Poland, Latvia, 
Estonia and Ukraine. Cooperation is also deepen-
ing with Western partners (such as Germany) who 
are interested in achieving democratic transition 
in Belarus, and in Lithuania’s intermediary role 
in providing the West with knowledge about the 
processes taking place in the country. By forming 
a broader coalition around the Belarusian issue, 
Lithuania can also more effectively persuade those 
allied countries which want to maintain coopera-
tion with Lukashenka-supporting Russia to change 
their positions. President Emmanuel Macron’s 
visit to Vilnius on 28-29 September will provide 
an opportunity to achieve this. One test of how 
effective the regional cooperation Lithuania has 
initiated is will be whether it can convince West-
ern countries to take joint decisions to put more 
pressure on Lukashenka and his closest associates.
